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INTRODUCTION
Although courage is one of the few character traits which shows up on everyone's list 
of virtues, there is no agreement about the nature and features of courage. Even within the 
ancient world we find substantial variation. For example, the Homeric view of courage as a 
certain role in a social structure differs from the Socratic view in the Laches that courage is a 
sort of knowledge, which differs from the Platonic view in the Republic that courage is a 
certain relationship of parts within the soul, which differs from the Aristotelian view in the 
Nicomachean Ethics that courage is a disposition to feel, choose, and act in certain ways. 
Although these days Aristotle is said to be the father of virtue ethics, Aristotle's account of 
courage is not widely accepted. Perhaps that is because Aristotle's account is thought to 
conflict with his architectonic and with the truth at crucial points. In particular, Aristotle is 
criticized (a) for narrowing the sphere of courage too severely, (b) for conflating what should 
be two separate virtues, (c) for applying an implausible version of the doctrine of the mean to 
courage, (d) for making courage into a form of continence, and (e) for both affirming and 
denying that courageous acts are pleasant for courageous people. I shall provide a passage-by- 
passage interpretation of Aristotle's account of courage in NE III.6-9 which will acquit 
Aristotle of these five charges. I shall argue that Aristotle (a) does not limit courage to life- 
threatening situations on the battlefield; (b) is right to maintain that courage governs both fear 
and confidence; (c) applies a plausible doctrine of the mean to courage; (d) appropriately 
distinguishes courage from continence; and (e) does not affirm that courageous acts are overall 
pleasant for courageous people. In general, I hope to garner more respect for Aristotle's 
account of courage.
THE SPHERE OF COURAGE
Philosophers disagree to some extent about which people are virtuous and which people 
are vicious. But even when philosophers agree that a certain character is virtuous, they may 
disagree about what the virtues are. That is, they may disagree about how to divide the 
character of a virtuous person into virtues. Some philosophers prefer to analyze the virtuous 
character finely into many virtues in order to avoid reductionism,1 while others prefer shorter 
lists of bulkier virtues in order to bring out certain relationships among character traits. Some 
list as virtues whatever character traits are valued by society.2 Others simply use whatever 
scheme is convenient. One might claim that each virtue corresponds to a different emotion,3 
or to a different sort of good,4 or a different mode of training/or a different temptátion.6 
However, Aristotle does none of these things. Instead, Aristotle proceeds in the following 
way. As a first approximation, he picks out important aspects of life in which a person must 
make some choices (risk, sensual pleasure, wealth, etc.), and maintains that each of these 
aspects is governed by a different virtue.7 That is, for each aspect of life, all acts involving 
that aspect exhibit a particular virtue or the absence of that virtue. Aristotle does not mention 
a method for picking out aspects. But then Aristotle does not claim that his list is
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comprehensive. Other virtues could be added to his list. Moreover, other lists might cover 
the same ground equally well. They might divide life into a different set of aspects and 
generate a different, but equally good set of virtues.
Aristotle’s second step is to narrow the aspect of each virtue by eliminating objects 
governed by other virtues. Aristotle is concerned to separate the spheres of the virtues in 
order to avoid overlap among the virtues. He wants his virtues to have disjoint spheres. That 
is, no act should exhibit more than one virtue or vice because each virtue governs different 
objects.8
Aristotle sometimes goes on to narrow the sphere of a virtue further using different 
principles. For example, after using the doctrine of disjoint spheres to narrow the sphere of 
temperance (,sophrosyne) from all pleasures to sensual pleasures (1117b31-1118al), Aristotle 
further restricts temperance to pleasures of touch (1118al6-27). Similarly, Aristotle not only 
uses the doctrine of disjoint spheres to eliminate honesty and dishonesty with respect to 
agreements from the sphere of truthfulness (1127a33-bl), he also restricts truthfulness to things 
which bring external goods to oneself (1127a9-17).
Fourth, in addition to narrowing the virtue's sphere, Aristotle often identifies a central 
exercise of the virtue, a core type of object among the objects governed by the virtue. For 
example, although temperance governs other tactile pleasures, it is particularly concerned with 
the pleasures of food, drink, and sex (1118b8). And although truthfulness governs both words 
and deeds which may bring various advantages to the agent or speaker, truthfulness is 
particularly concerned with claims about "the things which bring repute” (1127a21-22).9
Aristotle takes all four of these steps in describing courage (andreia). He assigns 
courage to an important aspect of life, applies the doctrine of disjoint spheres to this aspect, 
further limits the objects of courage in a different fashion, and finally identifies a paradigmatic 
class of actions which exhibit courage (and its associated vices). Aristotle begins his account 
of courage in III.6 by stipulating the sphere of courage, the subject matter of courage, to be 
fearful things or evils (1115a7). A natural view is that courage may be displayed toward a 
variety of different objects of fear and in a variety of different contexts. In the Laches 
Socrates includes, "not only those who are courageous in warfare, but also those who are 
brave in dangers at sea, and the ones who show courage in illness and poverty and affairs of 
state."10 Aristotle, however, rejects this natural view, explicitly addressing the objects and 
contexts mentioned by Socrates. He denies that the sphere of courage is all fearful things. 
Instead, Aristotle suggests that courage does not concern fears covered by other virtues.
[A] Now we fear all evils, e.g. disgrace, poverty, disease, friendlessness, death, 
but the brave man is not thought to be concerned with all. . . .  He who fears 
[disgrace] is good and modest, and he who does not is shameless. . . . Poverty 
and disease we perhaps ought not to fear, nor in general the things that do not 
proceed from vice and are not due to a man himself. But not even the man who 
is fearless of these is bravé. Yet we apply the word to him also in virtue of a 
similarity; for some who in the dangers of war are cowards are liberal and 
confident in the face of the loss of money. Nor is a man a coward if he fears 
insult to his wife and children or envy or anything of the kind; nor brave if he is 
confident when he is about to be flogged. (1115a 10-24)11
Aristotle argues here that even though people fear disgrace, disgrace is not an object in the 
sphere of courage because it is an object in the sphere of the quasi-virtue of shame (aidos) 
instead. Similarly, even though some people fear poverty, poverty is not governed by courage 
because it is governed by the virtue of liberality (eleutherios) instead. (See also 1122a3-7, 
1127a33-bl.)12 People fear insult and envy, but these are not governed by courage because 
they are already governed by good temper (praotes) and righteous indignation (nemesis) 2
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respectively. Some people fear flogging (as punishment), but this is already governed by 
justice (idikaiosune). And so on. People who display appropriate amounts of fear toward these 
objects are sometimes called courageous because of a resemblance to true courage, but this is 
an imprecise use of the term. That is, Aristotle wants to insure that a single token of passion 
or action cannot exhibit both courage (or one of the failure modes associated with courage) and 
some other virtue (or one of that virtue's associated failure modes).
After eliminating various objects of fear from the sphere of courage, Aristotle naturally 
asks what fearful objects remain.
[B] With what sort of terrible things, then, is the brave man concerned? Surely 
with the greatest; for no one is more likely than he to stand his ground against 
what is dreadful. Now death is the most terrible of all things. (1115a24-26)
On the basis of this passage, it is tempting to attribute to Aristotle the belief that courage is 
only concerned with death, that courage can be displayed only in life-threatening 
circumstances.13 However, we need not read passage [B] as saying that death is the only 
terrible thing with which the brave person is concerned. It is possible to read the passage as 
saying merely that death is one thing with which the courageous person is concerned. That is, 
Aristotle may be saying that if courage is concerned with anything, it is concerned with death. 
It is not only possible, but also charitable to read passage [B] in this way. The view that 
courage is only concerned with death flies in the face of common sense and contradicts 
Aristotle's later inclusion of wounds and pain in the sphere of courage (1117a32-33, 1117b7- 
9). Thus a charitable interpretation will not accuse Aristotle of restricting the objects of 
courage to modes of death, but will instead take Aristotle to be picking out a paradigm object 
within the sphere of courage to use as an illustration in succeeding passages.
Aristotle further narrows the sphere of courage in the following crucial and rather 
neglected passage.
[C] But the brave man would not seem to be concerned even with death in all 
circumstances, e.g. at sea or in disease. In what circumstances, then? Surely in 
the noblest. Now such deaths are those in battle. . . .  Yet at sea also, and in 
disease, the brave man is fearless, but not in the same way as the seamen; for he 
has given up hope for safety, and is disliking the thought of death in this shape, 
while they are hopeful because of their experience. At the same time, we show 
courage in situations where there is the opportunity of showing prowess or 
where death is noble; but in these forms of death neither of these conditions is 
fulfilled. (1115a28-b6)
In the last sentence of this passage Aristotle claims that courage governs situations where one 
can (a) "show prowess" and situations where (b) "death is noble (kalon)", but not in situations 
which meet neither condition. One can fear death in situations which meet neither condition. 
Why does courage not govern such situations? Aristotle illustrates this restriction of the sphere 
of courage with the situations of life-threatening danger at sea (for non-sailors) and 
(presumably terminal) illness. He says in these situations the brave man, "has given up hope 
for safety, and is disliking the thought of death in this shape." (a) Showing prowess is 
impossible in these situations because the brave man "has given up hope for safety". There is 
no possibility of avoiding the counter-goal in these situations, so there are no steps to take, no 
way to show prowess, (b) To be noble, death must have point, a reason. One must die for the 
sake of something worth dying for. But death at sea or from disease is pointless, and therefore 
ignoble. One's life is not sacrificed to defend one's city or accomplish some quest or maintain 
one's honor, etc.. There is no possibility of achieving an external goal. That is why the brave 
man "is disliking the thought of death in this shape." So Aristotle's claim may be rephrased in 
the following way. Showing courage is impossible in situations where (a) there is no way to
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avoid death (or wounds or pain), and (b) there is also no way to achieve a worthwhile 
objective. Courageous action requires either hope of safety, or hope of success, or both. It 
follows that according to Aristotle, the Spartans at Thermopole could display courage even 
though they knew that they were doomed, because there was still hope of achieving the 
worthwhile goal of slowing down the enemy. They had hope of achieving their external goal 
even though avoiding the counter-goal was impossible. Similarly, according to Aristotle, a 
person defending herself from attack may be acting courageously even though her act has no 
external goal, because she does have hope of avoiding the counter-goal of death, wounds, and 
pain.14 But one cannot act courageously in situations where there is neither (a) hope of 
avoiding the counter-goal nor (b) hope of achieving an external goal. In other words, 
displaying courage is impossible in situations where there are no grounds for confidence.15
Is Aristotle right to maintain that courage only governs situations where some 
confidence as well as some fear should be felt? A situation where fear should not be felt is a 
riskless situation. Courage would be superfluous. A situation where confidence should not be 
felt is a hopeless situation. Courage would be useless. Perhaps it is difficult to accept that 
courage does not govern situations in which there is no hope for avoiding the counter-goal or 
achieving an external goal. We do applaud people who face inevitable death, wounds, or pain 
with fortitude, without "breaking down".16 Typically, however, these harms are not 
pointless. The dying, bleeding, or screaming person has an external goal of inspiring others or 
proving a point, and hopes to achieve that goal by facing suffering with fortitude. These acts 
are not counterexamples to Aristotle's view. Aristotle would agree that Socrates acts 
courageously by drinking poison calmly, for even though Socrates has no reasonable hope of 
surviving, he does have a reasonable hope of inspiring others to lead the philosophic life. 
Aristotle would agree that Billy acts courageously by defying a bully with no hope of avoiding 
a beating, for even if Billy has no audience to impress, Billy has a reasonable hope of proving 
a point to himself (and perhaps to the bully). We also applaud people who face inevitable, 
pointless death, wounds, or pain with fortitude, people who suffer these harms calmly when 
nothing is to be gained. However, I suggest that we applaud these people only because we 
conflate their acts with acts like those of Socrates and Billy which are not pointless. We 
simply should not admire fortitude when the counter-goal is unavoidable and the external goal 
is unachievable, for fortitude in such situations is not courage. How can the act of not 
breaking down be either good or bad when, by hypothesis, it makes no difference to anything, 
when it has no chance of sparing the person or of accomplishing any worthwhile goal?
Aristotle is right to maintain that courage does not govern situations where confidence should 
not be felt.
PARAMETERS AND PASSIONS OF COURAGE
One central component of Aristotle's architectonic is that each virtue is a disposition to 
get several parameters right. In his general remarks about virtue Aristotle mentions right 
occasions, objects, people, goals, and manner (1106b21-23), but different virtues involve 
different parameters. For example, temperate people desire and enjoy the right objects on the 
right occasions to the right degree (1119M6-17). In III.7 Aristotle applies the thesis that virtue 
consists of getting several parameters of action and passion right to the virtue of courage and 
its related vices.
[D] Of the faults that are committed one consists in fearing what one should not, 
another in fearing as we should not, another consists in fearing when we should 
not, and so on; and so too with respect to the things that inspire confidence.
The man, then who faces and who fears the right things and with the right aim, 
in the right way and at the right time, and who feels confidence under the 
corresponding conditions, is brave. (1115M5-19)
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This passage makes several claims. First, the passage indicates that a courageous person fears 
the right things, the right way, and at the right time. So the parameters of courage include 
objects, amount, and frequency of fear. Fear is a function of these three variables. This 
aspect of courage may be modeled in a way which captures both Aristotle's target metaphor 
(1094a23-24, 1138b21-23) and his view that virtue is a mean of several parameters. Think of 
the three parameters as continua forming axes. Imagine two spheres centered on the 
intersection of the axes. The interior of the smaller sphere represents virtue. The area 
between the spheres represents vice. The exterior of the larger sphere represents brutishness. 
Shade half of the volume between the spheres. The shaded volume represents too little of each 
parameter; the unshaded volume between the spheres represents too much. Now every 
possible sort of fear concerned with courage can be represented as a point in three dimensional 
space. See illustration A.
One common view is that courage is simply overcoming one’s fear. Aristotle rejects 
this view. As I shall mention below, Aristotle denies that courage involves overcoming 
anything. And as I have mentioned above, Aristotle denies that courage involves all fears. He 
also denies that courage involves only fears. Aristotle says that courage "is a mean with 
regard to feelings of fear (phobos) and confidence (¡tharsos)" (1115a5). Thus, it comes as no 
surprise when Aristotle says at 1115M5-19 that a courageous person not only fears rightly, but 
also is confident about the right things, in the right way, and at the right time. The parameters 
of courage include objects, amount, and frequency of confidence. See illustration B.
It has been suggested that Aristotle should have divided courage into two virtues; one 
governing fear and the other governing confidence.17 However, this would conflict with the 
doctrine of disjoint spheres as well as with our own experience. If Aristotle divided courage 
into two virtues, each virtue could be unproblematically displayed in situations which were not 
governed by the other. However, many situations including the most common and central 
situations calling for courage, demand that the agent weigh the risks and benefits of different 
options. The agent must balance the seriousness and likelihood of some harm against the value 
and probability of achieving some goal. If fear and confidence were governed by different 
virtues then such situations would fall into the spheres of both virtues, violating the doctrine of 
disjoint spheres. Moreover, in such situations, the agent does not feel two emotions. Instead, 
the agent feels one emotion which is a sort of blend of fear and confidence. "We must talk of 
the feelings overlaying, suffusing, interpenetrating each other: e.g. boldness shot through with 
fear, fear mastered by confidence, spirited but worried determination, phlegmatic 
determination, ambivalence."18 Bundling fear and confidence together under one virtue 
captures this fact while separating fear and confidence contradicts it.
A third point stated in passage [D] is that courage requires more than just appropriate 
fear and confidence. The courageous person "faces the right things". To be courageous one 
must choose and act rightly, as well feeling fear and confidence rightly. Thus, modeling 
courage requires two more targets. Choice and action involve goals rather than amounts, so 
the parameters of the choice and action targets are objects, frequency, and goals. See 
illustrations C and D.
Virtue (<arete) is illustrated when all of the parameters of all four targets are medial.
To go wrong with respect to any of these parameters on any of these four targets is to lack 
courage. People who go wrong within the limits of the normal are vicious, continent, or 
incontinent; people who go very wrong are brutish (theriotes) or as we might say, mentally ill. 
For example, "The man who is by nature apt to fear everything, even the squeak of a mouse, 
is cowardly with a brutish cowardice" (1149a7-8). Similarly, "he would be a sort of madman 
or insensible person if he feared nothing, neither earthquakes nor the waves" (1115b26-27). 
Continence (enkrateia) is illustrated when the parameters of the fear and/or confidence targets 
are not medial, but the parameters of the choice and action targets are medial. Incontinence
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(akrateiä) is illustrated when the parameters of the fear and/or confidence targets and the 
action target are not medial, but the parameters of the choice target are medial. Vice is 
illustrated when the parameters of the fear and/or confidence targets and the choice and action 
targets are not medial.
Notice that a single type of act may be caused by a variety of different character traits.
Just as non-virtuous people of various sorts as well as virtuous people can perform virtuous 
acts (1105b5-12), so vicious acts can be performed by the incontinent and the brutish as well as 
by people with different sorts of cowardice and rashness. Some people flee from danger 
because they lack appropriate amounts of confidence that the counter-goal can be avoided or 
that the external goal can be achieved. Other people flee because although they are 
appropriately confident about the right objects before and after, they lack confidence at the 
time of the act. Still others flee because they feel excessive amounts of fear or fear the wrong 
objects. And so on.
Urmson criticizes Aristotle for not noticing "that it is possible, if unlikely, that one's 
character should exhibit deficiency in some respects, the mean in others, and excess in others, 
even with regard to a single specific excellence."19 But Aristotle does notice this. Aristotle's 
general point in III.8 is that people use the term "courage" loosely. They apply it to persons 
who resemble the courageous without being courageous. Common sense is sometimes wrong 
about whether a certain character trait is courage. Aristotle's examples of pseudo-courage also 
illustrate how it is possible to go wrong with respect to some of the courage parameters 
without going wrong with respect to others either on the same target or on different targets. 
Citizen-soldiers, for example, go wrong only with respect to the goal parameter. They get 
everything right except that instead of fighting to acquire or maintain their courage and to win 
the battle, they "face dangers because of the penalties imposed by the laws and the reproaches 
they would otherwise incur, and because of the honors they win by such action" (1116al8-19). 
Similarly, professional soldiers go wrong with respect to the "object" parameter, for they fly 
from some dangers which are not fearful enough to justify flight (1116M5-19). They 
excessively fear the right things on the right occasions. Indeed, it is common for a person to 
go to excess with respect to some parameters while being defective with respect to others on 
the same target. Such a person has both vices associated with courage. Aristotle correctly 
observes that people who are called rash often "are a mixture of rashness and cowardice" (1115b31-32).
Does Aristotle include all of the right parameters? Good tempered people correctly feel 
and exhibit anger with respect to the parameters of people and duration as well as the 
parameters of frequency, objects, and amount (1125b26-l 126a27). Now even though we 
sometimes say that we are afraid of certain people, we actually fear what these people may do 
to us rather than the people, themselves. Thus, courage does not include a people parameter.
On the other hand, I suggest that courage does involve a duration parameter. Some people 
typically feel the right amount of fear and confidence about the right objects on the right 
occasions, but then "lose their nerve" or "get cocky" while still in the courage-governed 
situation. That is, they become excessively afraid or confident. Such people do not maintain 
the right emotions for long enough. Other people remain afraid or confident after the danger 
and opportunity have passed. Such people maintain the right emotions for too long. Thus, 
duration seems to be a parameter of courage which is independent of the other three. And the 
right duration is a mean between too long and too short. Aristotle should have included the 
duration parameter in his account of courage just as he includes it in his account of good temper.
COURAGE AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN
Aristotle's much celebrated and much criticized doctrine of the mean is the core 
(though not the whole) of Aristotle's architectonic. The doctrine has two related components.
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First, each virtue is bracketed by two vices. Second, each vice is an excess or a defect of 
something. The following passage is Aristotle's general statement of the doctrine of the mean.
[E] [Virtue] is a mean between two vices, that which depends upon excess and 
that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices 
respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, 
while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. (1107a2-6)
Passage [E] indicates the link between the doctrine of the mean's two components. There are 
exactly two vices per virtue because the right quantity for each parameter is a mean between 
two extremes. Each virtuous action and passion is medial with respect to all relevant 
parameters. Going to excess with respect to any parameter(s) is one vice; being deficient with 
respect to any parameter(s) is the opposite vice.
Let us examine the application of the doctrine's two components to the virtue of 
courage. Does Aristotle believe that there are exactly two vices corresponding to courage? 
Well, on the one hand, in II.7 Aristotle mentions two opposite failure modes for every virtue 
except courage for which he mentions three.
[F] With regard to feelings of fear and confidence courage is the mean; of the 
people who exceed, he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name . . . while the 
man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and falls 
short in confidence is a coward. (1107a33-b4)
And in III.7 Aristotle mentions not two, but four failure modes with respect to courage, (a) 
insensitive fearlessness (deficient in fear), (b) rashness (excessive confidence), (c) rashness 
mixed with cowardice (excessive confidence and excessive fear), (d) cowardice (excessive fear 
and deficient in confidence). On the other hand, just as he does with most other virtues 
Aristotle bundles the people who lack courage into two clusters: those who go to excess 
(1115b24-35) and those who fall short (1115b35-l 116a2). And Aristotle sums up the 
relationship of the virtue and its associated error modes by contrasting courage with two 
extremes. He says,
[G] The coward, the rash man, and the brave man, then, are concerned with the 
same objects but are differently disposed toward them; for the first two exceed
and fall short, while the third holds the middle, which is the right, position. (1116a4-7)
Perhaps it would be best to put it this way. Aristotle uses the terms "rashness” and 
"cowardice" ambiguously. Let us say that rashness j is the general disposition to take some 
parameters of courage to excess, and rashness2 is the more specific disposition to take some 
parameters of confidence to excess. Similarly, cowardice, is the general disposition to take 
some parameters of courage to defect, and cowardice, is tne more specific disposition to take 
some parameters of fear to defect. Now we can see that Aristotle does believe that there are 
two vices corresponding to courage: rashnesSj and co ward ice r  Each of these two vices can 
take a variety of forms. The varieties of rashness j include insensitive fearlessness and 
rashness2 and the varieties of coward ice j include cowardice2 and overcaution. So excessive 
confidence is rashness2; deficient confidence is overcaution; excessive fear is cowardice2; and 
deficient fear is insensitive fearlessness.
Aristotle certainly believes that going wrong with respect to courage involves excess 
and defect and the right quantity for each parameter is a mean. Aristotle says, for example,
[H] Of those who go to excess he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name. The 
man who exceeds in fear is a coward; for he fears both what he ought not and as 
he ought not, and all the similar characterizations attach to him. (1115b24-1116a2)
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But is Aristotle right to maintain that the error modes of courage are excesses and defects? 
Hursthouse maintains that going wrong with respect to courage does not always involve 
excess and defect. She says, the concept of "right object [of courage] cannot be specified as a 
mean, and more generally, some vices that correspond to . . . courage cannot be understood as 
dispositions to exhibit or feel an emotion (a pathos) too much or too little. "20 Hursthouse 
observes that according to Aristotle it is right to fear only death, pain, and wounds. Then she 
imagines people who fear only the dark, enclosed spaces, and mice. Hursthouse calls such 
people fearless phobics and observes that they fear the wrong objects without fearing too many 
or too few objects.
Hursthouse's fearless phobics may be counterexamples to the thesis that (a) if a person 
goes wrong with respect to some parameter then he or she goes to excess or defect with respect 
to that parameter. However, Aristotle is not committed to this thesis. He is only committed to 
the weaker thesis that, (b) if a person goes wrong with respect to some parameter then he or 
she goes to excess or defect with respect to some parameter. It need not be the same 
parameter. For example, one sort of deficient fear is fearing only some of the right objects 
and no other objects, and this sort of fear is being deficient with respect to the object 
parameter. However, there are other sorts of deficient fear which involve wrong objects, but 
which are deficient with respect to parameters other than the object parameter. Fearless 
phobics fear the wrong objects without fearing too many or too few objects. They are not 
cases of excess or defect with respect to the object parameter. But, they are cases of excess 
and defect with respect to the amount parameter. They are too fearful about some things (e.g. 
mice) and insufficiently fearful about others (e.g. death). A fearless phobic is, therefore, a 
mixture of cowardice2 and overcaution. So Hursthouse's fearless phobics are not 
counterexamples to the thesis that (b) if a person goes wrong with respect to some parameter 
then he or she goes to excess or defect with respect to some parameter. And this thesis is all 
Aristotle needs for the doctrine of the mean.21
COURAGE AND CONTINENCE
The fact that courageous acts involve fear raises the question of how to distinguish the 
courageous person from the person who is merely continent. 2 Aristotle clearly believes that 
the courageous person is not merely continent (1146a9-16, 1151b34-1152a3). Yet the 
following argument seems to commit Aristotle to the thesis that the courageous person risking 
death (or wounds or pain) is continent.
(1) The courageous person feels fear and acts rightly. (1115bl1-13)
(2) This fear involves a desire to avoid death. (De An 413b24, 414b4-6, 431a8-10)
(3) The courageous person desires to avoid death and acts rightly, (from 1 & 2)
(4) The courageous person overcomes a desire to avoid death in order to act
rightly, (from 3)
(5) Overcoming a desire to avoid death in order to act rightly is continence.
(6) The courageous person is continent, (from 4 & 5)
One strategy for avoiding this contradiction is to deny that the courageous person feels 
fear, to deny premise (1). Perhaps the courageous person feels no fear because he or she does 
not believe that anything important is at risk. If, like Socrates, you think death is not an evil, 
then you will not be afraid in life-threatening situations. But as Heil observes, Aristotle rejects 
this view because he thinks the virtuous person feels fear when appropriate, and that death is 
an appropriate object for fear.23
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The usual way to state the difference between the virtuous and the merely continent is 
that virtuous people perform virtuous acts motivated, at least partially, by good desires without 
internal conflict, while continent people must overcome bad desires in order to perform the 
same virtuous acts. Heil redraws the distinction. On his interpretation, both the virtuous 
person and the continent person overcome desires to shirk virtuous acts. The difference is that 
the desires of the virtuous person are appropriate, but the desires of the continent person are 
inappropriate. So Heil denies premise (5). Although the courageous person on the battlefield 
overcomes a desire to flee, this conflict between reason and desire does not show that he or she 
is merely continent. It is appropriate to desire to flee because death is an appropriate object of 
fear, although actually fleeing the battle is wrong, of course.24
Heil pays a heavy price for his solution. First, Heil's claim that virtuous people 
struggle against their desires is incompatible with Aristotle's oft repeated claim that the 
virtuous person's reason and desire are in harmony (e.g. 1102b21-28). Second, on the 
standard view, good desires are those which should be acted upon, and bad desires are those 
which should be overcome. But on Heil's interpretation, desires to act viciously, desires 
which should be overcome, turn out to be good desires. What is good about them? Indeed, 
good and bad desires seem to be the same. Both courageous people and continent people 
desire to flee the battle, for example.
Leighton tries to exonerate Aristotle by arguing that fear is advantageous rather than 
merely something to be overcome. He takes Aristotle to be claiming that ''fear provides 
significant information about our surroundings, the imminence of painful or destructive evils." 
Moreover, "fear functions to warn us regarding [this] information." Finally, fear "provides 
the motivation, stimulates the thinking, and engages us in the action we need in order to deal 
with the circumstances of which it warns."25
There are three problems with Leighton's suggestion. First, Aristotle rightly 
understands fear to be a response to information rather than a provider of information. We do 
not first feel afraid, and then realize that danger is imminent. Instead, we first realize that 
danger is imminent, and then feel afraid. As Aristotle says, "fear is felt by those who bélieve 
something [bad] to be likely to happen to them . . . "  (Rhet 1382b33-34). So what makes fear a 
good thing is not that it informs us of danger and warns us that danger is bad. Second, fear 
does not motivate us to act. Aristotle defines fear simply as "a pain or disturbance due to a 
mental picture of some destructive or painful evil in the future" (Rhet 1382a22-23). Leighton 
is correct to maintain that fear is useful, but it is not useful because it sounds an alarm or kicks 
us into action. Instead, as Aristotle says, "fear sets us thinking what can be done" (Rhet 
1383a6-7). Fear is useful because it stimulates deliberation. The third problem with 
Leighton's suggestion is that it is irrelevant. Demonstrating the usefulness of fear does not 
distinguish the courageous from the continent. Something might be advantageous in some 
ways and yet still motivate us to perform cowardly acts. The question is not whether fear is 
advantageous, but rather whether fear typically needs to be overcome so that the courageous 
person must struggle against fear.
My strategy for allowing Aristotle to distinguish courage and continence is to challenge 
the validity of the above argument. Aristotle maintains that courageous people feel fear, and 
therefore desire to avoid death. But this desire does not imply that courageous people desire to 
avoid courageous acts such as standing fast in battle, for that is not the only way to avoid 
death. That is, statement (4) does not follow from statement (3). The cowardly person avoids 
death by shirking courageous acts, but the courageous person avoids death by performing 
courageous acts in ways which reduce the risk. Thus, the courageous person does not 
overcome a desire in order to perform courageous acts. The courageous person is not 
continent. Fear's contribution is not to oppose courageous acts, but rather to transform what 
might otherwise have been rash acts into careful acts. (Similarly, the contribution of 
confidence is to transform what might otherwise have been cowardly acts into risky acts.)
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Courageous people feel fear, but their fear does not push them toward cowardly acts like 
’’throw away the shield and run. " Instead their fear pushes them toward courageous acts like 
"tighten the shield strap to increase safety and fight. ”26 The claim that fear does not involve a 
desire to shirk courageous acts may seem implausible if one focuses upon life or death 
situations, but consider a child who is eager yet afraid to ride a horse, or a professor who is 
enthusiastic yet apprehensive about presenting a paper. Such cases are not best described as 
conflicts between a desire to avoid the act and a stronger desire to push on. Instead, the fear 
transforms the desire to push on into a desire to push on carefully. The child holds on tight; 
the professor reviews his or her notes yet again. The fear involves a desire to reduce risk by 
performing the activity carefully rather than a desire to reduce risk by avoiding the activity 
altogether.
Indeed, the thesis that fear need not involve a temptation to flee the battle seems 
implausible to contemporary common sense only because, unlike Aristotle, contemporary 
common sense thinks that continence is the best we can hope for. One interpretation of the 
Christian doctrine of original sin is that temptation is inevitable, and so the best person is the 
person who successfully resists temptation. Applying this doctrine to the battlefield situation 
yields the claim that the best person successfully resists the temptation to flee. Since courage 
must name the best state of character with respect to fear, and since contemporary common 
sense is infected by the Christian doctrine of original sin, contemporary common sense names 
the disposition to resist the temptation to flee, courage. Thus, when the child who performs 
several brave acts says, "I was afraid, so I am not really brave," the child is told that courage 
consists in overcoming fear. Contemporary common sense calls the character trait of 
Aristotelian continence, courage.
For many situations, the best most of us seem able to do is overcome our vicious 
desires. The widespread practice of dieting, for example, is one familiar illustration of this 
fact. However, I maintain that Aristotle and the child are right about courage, and about 
temptation in general. It is not that virtue is continence, but rather that virtue is rare and hard. 
So few of us make it past continence that contemporary common sense has lost faith in a state 
beyond continence. Yet just as most people acknowledge, when pushed, that there are people 
who do not need to diet, who give charity without reluctance, who do not get inappropriately 
angry, so contemporary common sense should acknowledge that there are people who reliably 
perform courageous acts without having to overcome a desire to do otherwise.
PLEASURE, PAIN, AND COURAGE
Aristotle seems to contradict himself on the question of whether courageous acts are 
painful. In II.3 he says,
[I] We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain that 
supervenes on acts; for . . . he who stands his ground against things that are 
terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained is brave, while the man who 
is pained is a coward. . . . Hence we ought to have been brought up in a 
particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to 
be pained by the things that we ought; for this is the right education. (1104b3-13)
Here Aristotle seems to be saying that a courageous person performing a courageous act feels 
pleasure or at least feels no pain. This is a central claim for Aristotle because he uses pleasure 
and pain both as evidence of a person's virtue (as the first sentence says) and as part of a 
pedagogical strategy (as the last sentence says). Yet in III.9 where Aristotle devotes a whole 
chapter to the relation of courage and pain and pleasure, he says of the courageous person,
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[J] Death and wounds will be painful to the brave man and against his will, but 
he will face them because it is noble to do so or because it is base not to do so 
the more he is possessed of virtue in its entirety and the happier he is, the more 
he will be pained at the thought of death . . .  It is not the case, then, with all the 
virtues that the exercise of them is pleasant, except in so far as it reaches its 
end. (1117b9-16)
Here Aristotle seems to be saying that even though achieving the external goal of a  courageous 
act is pleasant for the courageous person, the courageous act, itself, is typically painful to 
perform and even to contemplate. 7
An examination of some aspects of Aristotle's view of the relationship between virtuous 
acts and pleasure will resolve this tension. In passage [I] Aristotle is talking about a type of 
pleasure or pain that results from the awareness that one is acting well or badly. The virtuous 
person enjoys performing virtuous acts because he or she knows that the acts are virtuous and 
is pained by performing vicious acts because he or she knows that the acts are vicious. 
(Similarly, the vicious person, having the wrong principles, is pained by performing virtuous 
acts because he or she believes that the acts are vicious.) That is, the virtuous person enjoys 
the realization that he or she is performing a virtuous act. The temperate person feels this 
second order pleasure upon performing temperate acts, the liberal person upon performing 
liberal acts, and the courageous person upon performing courageous acts. However, Aristotle 
is not making a claim about the overall pleasantness of the act in passage [J]. In addition to the 
second order pleasure felt by virtuous people because of their realization that they are 
performing virtuous acts, virtuous acts also generate first order pleasures and pains. Just as 
temperate acts produce sensual pleasures and pains and liberal acts produce the pleasures and 
pains of spending and giving, so courageous acts produce the pleasures and pains of taking 
risks in order to achieve worthwhile goals. In passage [J] Aristotle is maintaining that when 
both first and second order pleasure and pain are considered, some virtuous acts (in particular, 
some courageous acts) produce more pain than pleasure for the virtuous person.
The first order pleasures of courageous acts arise predominately from the attainment of 
the goals. In the first part of passage [J] Aristotle is making the point that the first order pains 
arise from "death and wounds" and even "the thought of death." In the last part of passage [J] 
Aristotle is saying that if the goal of a courageous act is not achieved, then the first order pain 
outweighs the second order pleasure, and the act is overall painful. However, if the goal of a 
courageous act is achieved, then the first order pain is outweighed by first order pleasures of 
goal attainment plus the second order pleasure. The act is overall pleasant. Thus, a 
courageous act is typically not pleasant "except in so far as it reaches its end. "28
CONCLUSION
Aristotle's account of courage exhibits several general principles of his architectonic. 
First, Aristotle applies to courage what I have called the doctrine of disjoint spheres. (1) Each 
virtue has its own sphere completely separate from the spheres of all other virtues. Aristotle 
then goes on to narrow the sphere of courage by insisting correctly that courage governs only 
situations involving both fear and confidence. Aristotle does not make the mistake of further 
restricting courage to life-threatening situations.
Like his accounts of other virtues, Aristotle's account of courage involves several 
different parameters. (2) Each virtue is a disposition for getting all of the relevant parameters 
right. (3) People can go wrong with respect to some parameter without going wrong with 
respect to the others. This produces some character traits which are often mistaken for 
courage because they resemble courage in some respects. People can even be excessive with
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respect to some parameters while being defective with respect to others. They can be rash 
cowards. Aristotle neglects the duration parameter of courage. On the other hand, he rightly 
avoids the temptation to divide courage into a fear virtue and a confidence virtue.
Aristotle's account of courage conforms to his doctrine of the mean. (4) For each 
parameter there are two ways to go wrong. (5) A disposition for going to excess with respect 
to any parameter(s) is one vice; a disposition for being deficient with respect to any 
parameter(s) is the opposite vice; and a disposition for getting all of the parameters in a mean 
is virtue. Aristotle is committed to the plausible thesis that, if a person goes wrong with 
respect to some parameter then he or she goes to excess or defect with respect to some 
parameter, rather than the dubious thesis that if a person goes wrong with respect to some 
parameter then he or she goes to excess or defect with respect to that parameter.
Virtue and vice are not the only sorts of character traits. (6) A disposition for getting 
choice and action right despite going wrong with respect to some other parameter(s) is 
continence; a disposition for getting choice right but action wrong because of going wrong with 
respect to some other parameter(s) is incontinence. (7) A disposition for going very wrong is 
brutishness. As long as we recognize that fear can push people to guard their safety not only 
by performing cowardly acts, but also by being careful about performing courageous acts, we 
will see that Aristotle does not conflate courage and continence.
Aristotle does not contradict himself by maintaining that courageous acts both are and 
are riot pleasant for the courageous. (8) He believes that virtuous actions may produce both 
first order pleasures and first order pains for virtuous people. (9) However, virtuous people 
always enjoy the realization that they are performing virtuous acts. In the case of courage, the 
first order pains of courageous acts typically outweigh the pleasure of knowing that one is 
acting rightly except in cases where the courageous act achieves its external goal.
Overall, Aristotle's account of courage in NE III.6-9 illustrates many of the 
components of Aristotle's architectonic of the virtues without going wrong in the five ways that 
critics have suggested. Therefore, Aristotle's account of courage deserves more respect.
NOTES
1. E. Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986).
2. Although many have accused Aristotle of this, he is not guilty. Aristotle is an 
innovator, not a mere expositor and apologist for his society. (P. Gottlieb, "Aristotle's 
'Nameless' Virtues," Phronesis, p. 1-15).
3. Urmson attributes this view to Aristotle (Urmson, Aristotle's Ethics, [Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1988], p. 37). But for Aristotle some virtues involve more than one passion; some 
virtues involve none. Courage, for example, involves fear and confidence, but friendliness, 
truthfulness, and ready wit involve no passion. So it is not true that to every virtue there 
corresponds exactly one passion. Similarly, it is not true that to every passion there 
corresponds exactly one virtue. Fear, for example, is not governed solely by courage. 
Courage concerns fear of death, wounds, and pain, but fear of disgrace, poverty, insult, and 
friendlessness are governed respectively by the virtues of shame, liberality, good temper, and 
friendship (1115al0-24). Thus, Aristotle does not assign each virtue to a different emotion.
4. Reeve attributes this view to Aristotle (C. D. C. Reeve, Practices o f Reason [Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1992], p. 169-171). But for Aristotle some virtues involve more 
than one good; some virtues involve none. Temperance governs food, drink, and sex, while 
wit is a virtue that governs no external good. Similarly, it is not true that to every good there
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corresponds exactly one virtue. Beauty is an external good not governed by a virtue, while 
wealth is governed in different ways by both liberality and justice. Thus, Aristotle does not 
assign each virtue to a different sort of good.
5. Irwin attributes this view to Aristotle. He explains Aristotle's restriction of temperance 
to the pleasures of touch and taste in the following way. "Different forms of over-indulgence 
associated with different desires need separate training; a reduction in someone's desire to 
listen to music will not necessarily reduce his excessive liking for whiskey" (Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics, trans. T. Irwin [Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985], p. 323). However, 
reducing a person's desire for sex will not necessarily reduce his or her excessive liking for 
whiskey, either. Moreover, reducing a person's desire for honor might also reduce his or her 
excessive liking for wealth. There is no reason to think that there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between modes of training and spheres of virtue and no reason to attribute this 
view to Aristotle, either.
6. Ross maintains that each virtue is a tendency to resist a different sort of temptation. 
Thus, Ross accuses Aristotle's account of courage of conflating two virtues: caution which is 
the resisting of rashness and courage which is the resisting of cowardice. (W. D. Ross, 
Aristotle [London: Methuen, 1923], p. 205-206.) As other commentators have observed, this 
principle reduces virtue to continence. But there are other objections to Ross's interpretation, 
too. Aristotle observes that there are many tempting ways of going wrong for each way of 
going right (1106b35). So Ross's interpretation implies that every time a person acts and feels 
right, he or she is displaying a multitude of virtues.
Hursthouse suggests that one virtue governs food and drink while another virtue 
governs sex because people can go wrong with respect to one without going wrong with 
respect to the other (R. Hursthouse "A False Doctrine of the Mean," Proceedings o f the 
Aristotelian Society, 81 [1980-1981], p. 62). In general, Hursthouse is suggesting that two 
objects should be in different spheres if a person can go wrong with respect to one without 
going wrong with respect to the other. But people can go wrong with respect to chocolate and 
not broccoli, even though these foods clearly belong in the same sphere. An intemperate 
person goes wrong with respect to some, but not necessarily all of the pleasures of temperance. 
In general, each virtue must govern many sorts of failures.
7. M. Nussbaum, "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach," Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, 13 (1988), p. 35.
8. For Aristotle, an act is always a behavior-under-a-description. The same behavior (the 
same set of motions) may have several different descriptions, and therefore may be several 
different acts. Thus, the same behavior may exhibit different virtues under different 
descriptions.
9. Sparshott suggests that the standard use of the virtue term provides focal meaning to the 
virtue, that "all the related uses are to be explained by one paradigm case, much in the same 
way that substance is the paradigm of 'being' " (F. Sparshott, Taking Life Seriously [Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1994], p. 150). However, it is not the case that the many 
exercises of the virtue are understood in terms of a paradigm exercise. Instead, the standard 
exercise is simply the clearest or the most common exercise of the virtue.
10. Plato, Laches, trans. R. Sprague, 191d.
11. All quotations from Aristotle are taken from The Complete W?rks o f Aristotle, ed. J. 
Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) except that I translate arete as "virtue" 
rather than "excellence".
12. Aristotle's suggestion that we should not fear poverty, disease, or "in general the things
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that do not proceed from vice and are not due to a man himself" is a mistake. First, poverty 
and disease often result from the vices of prodigality and self-indulgence (1119b34-1120al,
1119al6-20). Second, Aristotle acknowledges that we should fear death in battle which 
typically is not the result of vice. So Aristotle's specific claim about poverty and disease as 
well as his general claim about fearing things that do not arise from vice are incorrect and 
inconsistent with his other claims.
13. A. Duff, "Aristotelian Courage,"/tarío, 29 (1987), p. 2-155; Ross, 207.
14. Pears denies and Duff affirms that, according to Aristotle, the Spartans at Thermopole 
can display courage (D. Pears, "Courage as a Mean," Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. A. 
Rorty, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 183; Duff, 10-14). Pears affirms 
and Rogers denies that courageous acts are always performed for the sake of some external 
goal. Thus, Pears denies and Rogers affirms that, according to Aristotle, the person defending 
herself from attack can display courage (D. Pears, "Aristotle's Analysis of Courage," Midwest 
Studies in Philosophy, 3 [1987], p. 273). (K. Rogers, "Aristotle on the Motive of Courage," 
The Southern Journal o f Philosophy, 32 [1994], p. 304-305). In addition to the counter-goal 
and the external goal, courageous action also has an internal goal. This goal terminology was 
originally deployed by Pears.
15. Stocker suggests that just as the object of fear is the counter-goal , so the object of 
confidence is the external goal. (M. Stocker, Plural and Conflicting Values [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990], p. 131, 140). However, one can also feel some confidence about the 
avoidance of the counter-goal.
16. Indeed, Duff takes the martyr who "goes willingly (even gladly) to her death" to be a 
paradigm of Aristotelian courage (Duff, 10). It is not clear whether Duff takes the martyr's 
death to have an external goal, however.
17. J. O. Urmson, "Aristotle Doctrine of the Mean," Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. A. 
Rorty, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 169-170; Ross, 206. The question 
of whether Aristotelian courage should be divided into two virtues is different from the 
question (mentioned above) of whether courage should be limited to situations requiring both 
fear and confidence. Theoretically, a virtue list might contain a single virtue of courage 
governing situations involving either fear or confidence as will as situations involving both.
Or a virtue list might contain both a fear virtue and a confidence virtue, each of which governs 
only situations requiring both fear and confidence.
18. Stocker, 143.
19. Urmson, "Aristotle Doctrine of the Mean," 161.
20. Hursthouse, 61.
21. For a more thorough rebuttal of Hursthouse, see H. Curzer, "A Defense of Aristotle's 
Doctrine of the Mean, " Ancient Philosophy, 16 (1996), 1-10.
22. Technically, Aristotle uses the terms, "continence" and "incontinence" to stand for the 
continence and incontinence corresponding to temperance, but he allows that there are 
analogous character traits corresponding to other virtues. In this paper I shall use "continence" 
and "incontinence" to stand for the continence and incontinence corresponding to courage.
23. J. Heil, "Why is Aristotle's Brave Man So Frightened? The Paradox of Courage in the 
Eudemian Ethics," Apeiron, 29 (1996), p. 55-57.
24. Heil, 50-52, 65-68. Heil claims that courage is a form of endurance (¡cartería). But
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Aristotle defines endurance as overcoming a desire to avoid pain in order to act rightly, just as 
continence is overcoming a desire for pleasure in order to act rightly. (Aristotle sometimes 
subsumes both under the term "continence".) Endurance is not overcoming good desires or 
overcoming good desires to avoid pain. Moreover, tying courage to endurance is problematic. 
Aristotle distinguishes virtue from endurance (1145a33-1145b2). Indeed, Aristotle says that 
endurance is worse than continence (1150a36-bl) so endurance is certainly worse than virtue, 
and not equal to virtue as Heil's interpretation requires.
25. S. Layton, "Aristotle's Courageous Passions," Phronesis, 33, (1988), p. 90-94.
26. Duff, 10-13; Leighton, 94; Stocker, 144; C. Young, "Aristotle on Courage," 
Humanitas: Essays in Honor o f Ralph Ross, ed. Q. Howe (Claremont California, Scripps 
College Press, 1977), p. 198.
27. Broadie tries to resolve this contradiction by suggesting that when Aristotle says that 
the courageous agent is pleased or not pained by a courageous act, Aristotle means that he or 
she acts without reluctance and takes satisfaction from performing the act. But when Aristotle 
says that the courageous agent is pained Aristotle means that he or she feels pain (S. Broadie, 
Ethics with Aristotle [New York: Oxford University Press, 1991], p. 91). I think Broadie's 
attempt at resolution fails, however. Throughout II.3 "pleasure" seems to mean pleasure 
rather than non-reluctance.
28. Duff also thinks that the courageous person feels a mixture of pleasure and pain. 
However, Duff thinks the pleasure outweighs the pain while transforming the fear because the 
courageous person is confident in the worth of his or her actions (Duff, 10-14).
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